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In 2013, a new technology, GeneXpert, was introduced in India, which, in addition to
testing for TB, could also diagnose whether the detected strain was drug resistant. By
detecting the bacterium more effectively than other available tests and simultaneously
testing for resistance, GeneXpert promised to reduce the delay in diagnosis and hence
ineffective treatments. The new test was introduced to multiple cities via a coalition
that included global health funding bodies, the government of India, the World Health
Organization, and non-governmental organizations. Despite the concerted effort of the
coalition, among formal providers (those trained in biomedicine) in the private sector,
the new technology was not adopted as quickly as had been hoped. Examining formal
providers’ initial responses to the technology’s introduction in the city of Patna reveals
how the adoption of new technology can be influenced by the particularities of the
local medical market such as the availability of diagnostic tests, presence of informal
providers, and reputation of formal providers. While protocols and operations might seem
standardized across implementation plans, the work that is required to ensure success
must take into account the particular role that the market plays from site to site.
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INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, a new technology became available for diagnosing tuberculosis (TB) in
India that seemingly remedied the inefficiencies of the existing technology, namely, the sputum
smear microscopy (or the sputum Acid Fast Bacilli)1. In 2010, the automated Cartridge-Based
Nucleic Acid Amplification Test (CBNAAT) was endorsed by the World Health Organization
(WHO) and subsequently promoted by India’s National Strategic Plan (NSP) for Tuberculosis
Control for the years 2012–2017 [World Health Organization (WHO), 2013]. This diagnostic
test not only delivers results in 2 h but also shows whether the TB bacterium has developed
resistance to rifampicin, a drug widely used as the first-line treatment for TB. During this
period, in the eastern Indian city of Patna, a network of actors used a new model of
global health intervention called the Private Provider Interface Agency (PPIA) to introduce
the CBNAAT product, branded and marketed as GeneXpert (Gopalakrishnan, 2015). Health
providers received the new technology, marketed with the promise and hope of solving the
complex issue that is India’s TB epidemic, with suspicion. I conducted over 20 months of
1I wish to acknowledge the comments of Veena Das, Jishnu Das, Madhukar Pai, Ada Kwan, Ben Daniels, and the entire Qutub
Project team, especially ISERDD that made my research possible and the article richer.
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ethnographic research with various actors in the existing
medical infrastructure in Patna as part of a team evaluating
the impact of the PPIA health intervention. My ethnography
included interviewing as well as shadowing formal health care
providers trained in biomedicine, lab technicians, patients,
compounders, and pharmacists. Wariness to new technology
must be understood in relation to the history of a particular
medical landscape. While the intervention is currently still in
place, the ethnography reflects the initial concerns and anxieties
of actors in the field that provoked innovation and modifications
in implementation to ensure success.
GeneXpert did not simply replace older technologies such as
chest X-rays or sputum Acid-Fast Bacilli smear tests (“sputum
AFB”), the existing methods used by providers to diagnose
patients with TB. The providers in the city had fine-tuned and
built their own clinical protocol to diagnose patients with TB
through decades of experience. They were unwilling to set their
history of practice aside to passively follow the directions set
forth by the new technology. Instead, they embarked on a critical
assessment of the technology and absorbed it into their protocol
for evaluating and diagnosing patients in varying ways. These
myriad ways of using a new piece of technology not only reflect
the heterogeneous protocols and definitions of health but also
reveal the impact of intractable particularities of one site or city
on the uptake or success of that technology. In other words,
the promise of new medical technology depends on whether it
enables or endangers the expertise and authority of the provider
that is constitutive of being diagnosed with a disease.
OLD DISEASE, NEW CONCERNS
In the 1990’s, the HIV epidemic along with the spread of drug-
resistant TB spurred the Indian state to implement newmeasures
to test, treat, and control the TB epidemic. The resulting plan,
called the Revised National Tuberculosis Control Plan (RNTCP),
centered around strategies of Directly Observed Treatment–
Short Term, popularized through the acronym DOTS and its
expanded version, DOTS-Plus. These strategies were piloted,
implemented, and scaled up in phases that lasted from 1993 to
2005. The limitations and failures of these strategies, ranging
from alternate day regimen, requiring that the medicine be
taken in front of the clinic’s staff, and conflating completion
of treatment as per protocols with curing of TB, are well-
documented (Das and Das, 2007; Ecks and Harper, 2013;
Das, 2015). These failures have also shown to increase the
vulnerability of patients to developing drug resistance rather
than prevent them. One of the changes that DOTS aimed
to achieve was a reduction in the use of X-rays to diagnose
TB and concurrently to encourage the use of sputum AFB.
Variations in clinical presentation, inciting and reporting clinical
histories, and differential diagnoses made X-rays a poor choice
for diagnosing a patient with TB because they lacked disease
specificity. Since the DOTS centers were based in the public
sector, it was possible for the program to achieve the high targets
set for diagnoses based on sputum AFB and completed treatment
rate [World Health Organization (WHO), 2000]. Yet, the TB
epidemic failed to come under control and the risk of drug-
resistant TB increased. One of the important factors that emerged
as crucial to combating TB was the large number of patients who
continued to get diagnosed and seek treatment in the private
sector, whose estimated proportion of TB patients was large but
not precise (Pathania et al., 1997).
While suspicions on the part of the state regarding the quality
and cost of care in the unregulated private sector that resulted
in patients not completing or defaulting on treatment were well-
founded based on existing research, efforts to engage the private
sector were limited to a set of pilots and experiments (Dewan
et al., 2006; Satyanarayana et al., 2011). At the end of the second
phase (2005–2012) of RNTCP, it was evident that the private
sector would have to be tackled at multiple levels for India to
rid itself of TB. Since TB was not declared a notifiable disease
until 2012 under the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897, there was
no way of knowing how many patients with TB were diagnosed
or treated in the private sector (Bhaumik and Biswas, 2012;
Rakesh, 2016). It was estimated that at least a million cases were
“missing” in India—“missing” signifying either the patients had
been diagnosed but not notified or not diagnosed at all [World
Health Organization (WHO), 2014a; Raizada et al., 2015]. To
capture the “missing million,” efforts to engage the private sector
were renewed in the hope that providers would not only notify
patients they had diagnosed but also change their behavior to test
patients for TB sooner rather than later. It was expected that the
new technology of GeneXpert that was introduced by the PPIA
intervention would facilitate this change in behavior.
TIME, TRIAGE, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
The imperative to engage the private sector would not have
emerged if the “missing million” were being treated adequately: if
patients were receiving adequate treatment, it would be reflected
in a substantial reduction in mortality from TB. The inadequacy
and hence the critical importance of engaging the private sector
centered on the issues of misdiagnosis and delay in diagnosis.
Several sets of research and data were pieced together by Global
Health researchers to create a linear narrative of the patient’s
journey of being diagnosed in the private sector, which then
informed the strategy of the PPIA. After the second phase of
the RNTCP (2005–2012), the Central TB Division of the Indian
government drafted a National Strategic Plan (NSP) that was to
last from (Central TB Division, Directorate General of Health
Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2012-2017).
The NSP cited the National Family Health Survey that was
released in 2005–2006 that showed that a provider in the private
sector was the first point of contact for more than 80% of all
patients. The NSP explained that patients were switching from
private to public providers as a result of economic pressures
that grew higher because of the long duration of TB treatment,
ineffective treatment for their illness, and a lack of follow-
up that ensured completed treatment and hence exacerbated
the risk of developing drug resistance (Central TB Division,
Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare, 2012, p. 30). The “missing million” were
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framed as patients facing a delay in proper diagnosis, a delay
in treatment, or incomplete and partial treatment resulting in
a higher risk of mortality. Furthermore, with the established
risk of acquiring drug-resistant TB infection directly rather than
only through intermittent and improper use of the anti-TB
regimen, it became even more urgent that the private sector be
engaged in order to shorten the delay in diagnosing TB patients.
Shortening that delay emerged as a focal point, one that would
guide interventions to correct the multiple issues that defined
the persistent epidemic, and GeneXpert was thought to be the
“solution in a box” that would remedy misdiagnoses, detect drug
resistance, and consequently reduce delay (Redfield, 2012).
A systematic review of existing literature in public health
was conducted, which calculated that the median delay from
onset of symptoms to diagnosis and treatment was 55.3 days
(Sreeramareddy et al., 2014). Furthermore, the authors of this
review calculated that patients consulted an average of 2.7 health
care providers, including those called informal or unqualified
providers—or more pejoratively, “quacks”—before patients were
correctly diagnosed with TB. The vast private medical sector
in India includes private hospitals and physicians with medical
degrees trained in biomedicine who practice privately in clinics
of varying sizes as well as a heterogeneous mix of informal
providers. Das (2015) offers a concise view of how varied the
informal sector is: it can be divided not only according to
practitioners’ training and discipline (Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani,
Siddha, Homoepathy, and Naturopathy) but also according
to the legitimacy offered to them by the state. Since many
of these disciplines have a continuous history of negotiation
with the state regarding the legality of their practice, informal
providers might or might not have formal training, licenses, and
certificates. Alongside these providers are also informal providers
who offer services that range from administering injections,
dispensing medicines, to running clinics and nursing homes
that provide pregnancy and childbirth care, emergency care, and
other services. These providers once again can be sanctioned by
the state to practice through various licenses that certify them as
Rural Medical Practitioners or Private Medical Practitioners to
fill the gap left by the lack of state provision in the rural areas
(Das, 2015, p. 159–180).
Anthropological studies looking into why the informal sector
cannot simply be ignored, avoided, or policed show how these
bodies of medical knowledge and practice enjoy a robust life
in India at multiple levels, including the neighborhood, the
rural, and the national (Langford, 2002; Barrett, 2008; Lambert,
2012; Ecks, 2013; Alter, 2014). Yet, the informal sector is mostly
configured in public health as the source of problems, including
the problems of delayed diagnosis of TB and drug resistance—
both of drug-resistant TB and of antibiotic resistance—and
therefore must be heavily policed (Satyanarayana et al., 2016).
Harper writes, “A DOTS program officer in Uttar Pradesh
assumed that 60–70 per cent of resistance was due to “barefoot
doctors” or quacks and the misuse of rifampicin by them, and
the giving of incorrect combinations” (Harper, 2009, p. 54).
Even in studies that attempt to map the TB patient’s journey
from symptom to diagnosis through surveys and interviews, the
informal provider emerges as a necessary target for intervention
in attempts to address delay in diagnosis, despite clues pointing
to complicated relationships between poverty, illness, everyday
life, expertise, and technology (Uplekar et al., 2001; Kapoor et al.,
2012; Wells et al., 2015; Mistry et al., 2016).
While part of the blame for missing or wrongly diagnosing
patients was put on the informal providers who did have
the expertise, another part was placed on outdated or faulty
technology that made it difficult for formal providers to use their
expertise to detect TB cases. The cheapest and most accurate test
for an active TB infection for the last 125 years has been the
sputum AFB, which tests the presence of the bacteria by staining
the sputum sample with a reagent. Given the notorious lack of
specificity and sensitivity of other tests such as X-rays, serological
tests (TB-Gold), and tuberculin skin tests (the Mantoux test), the
renewed efforts to control TB since the 1990’s have emphasized
the use of the sputum AFB test and set high targets for the
number of TB cases to be confirmed through sputummicroscopy
(Pio et al., 1997). There were several proximate reasons for
this insistence on sputum AFB, and they emerge from what
Lock and Nguyen have called “biosocial differentiation” (Lock
and Nguyen, 2010) referring to “the continual interactions
of biological and social processes across time and space that
eventually sediment into local biologies” (Lock and Nguyen,
2010, p. 90). Local biologies in the form of comorbidities and
reinfections made providers think of differential diagnoses and
consequently made X-rays unreliable. The older technology of
the Mantoux test that still exists has been proven to be effective
only in measuring latent TB infection, which once again is not
helpful for diagnosing an active TB infection in India, where
given the well-documented history of widespread TB infection
among the population, a majority of that population, if not all,
have latent TB (Little et al., 2015). Furthermore, the serological
tests that were banned in 2012 because of their inaccuracy remain
popular in Patna. The PPIA intervention incentivized informal
providers to direct patients with the classic symptoms of TB
to formal providers because it would correct one point in the
cascade of care that purportedly caused the delay of diagnosis and
the formal providers were incentivized to encourage the uptake
of GeneXpert. It was assumed that formal providers, as rational
actors, would quickly realize the benefit of a quick diagnosis that
the technology offered and would then use it on their own even
without incentives.
THE PRIVATE PROVIDER INTERFACE
AGENCY
During the second phase of the RNTCP (2005–2012), efforts
to engage the formal providers in the private sector were
renewed and schemes were implemented that would allow formal
providers to test patients for free. To achieve the twin goals
of ensuring patients were diagnosed on the basis of sputum
AFB as well as ensuring that the standardized treatment for TB
was provided, the state activated an extensive infrastructure to
direct private providers and their patients to the public sector.
Grants were made available to non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs), and private
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providers in order to assist and facilitate the direction of the
patients from the private sector to the public sector, alongside
engaging private diagnostic labs where sputum samples could
be tested. After judging the technical capacity and quality of
the labs, RNTCP allowed these labs to be known as Designated
Microscopy Centers, where the private providers could send their
patients. In other words, it could be said that these private labs
served as proxies for government labs, but only for TB patients.
Among private labs, 12,000 were designated. In places where such
labs were not available, sputum collection centers were set up so
that they could be then transported to theDesignatedMicroscopy
Centers or to the labs in the public sector. Furthermore, the
NGOs, CBOs, and private providers who agreed to partner for
such schemes were given grants to hire staff to transport the
sputum samples from clinics to the labs (Central TB Division,
Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, 2008). The failure of this vast infrastructure
activated by the public sector further strengthened the argument
to engage the private sector.
Several changes entirely reconfigured the engagement
between the public and the private sector with respect to the TB
epidemic. The most noticeable change was effected by making
TB a notifiable disease in 2012 because while previously referral
implied handing over the patients to the public sector, legally
required notification meant that while the private sector could
continue testing and treating patients, the state would have
a larger role in supervising and implementing standardized
protocols in the private sector. Because the previous objectives
of limiting the private sector’s share of diagnosing and treating
TB patients failed, the new goal of engaging the private sector
also meant that while the state could require private providers to
notify, it could not make it mandatory for the private providers
to direct patients to the public sector for care. The split between
notifications and referral implied that the state and the private
market had to negotiate the terms and conditions under which
private providers were willing to be policed, disciplined, and
punished for their management of TB patients. While the
providers were required to notify and follow the official protocol
outlined in the Standards for TB Care in India, they were
allowed to make patients buy medicines privately, since free
medications were only available in the public sector [World
Health Organization (WHO), 2014b]. The language of policing is
not surprisingly couched in terms of support offered rather than
support needed: the guidelines state that “notification gives an
opportunity to support private sector for following standardized
practices in terms of Standard TB Care” (emphasis mine, Central
TB Division, Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of
Health and FamilyWelfare, 2012, p. 4). This change in increasing
state control is reflected in the guidelines for private providers
where they are assured that the health worker will only check
whether the patients have been treated according to the official
protocol and offer “TB treatment under RNTCP, if desired by the
patients” (Central TB Division, Directorate General of Health
Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2012, p. 8).
To gauge how such a change in the private sector could
be effectively implemented, a new intervention was designed,
the PPIA, and piloted in the cities of Patna and Mumbai, as
well as in Mehsana, a district in Gujarat. The initial designs of
the PPIA model was outlined in the NSP for the years 2012–
2017 with the technical assistance and funding of the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, under the state’s RNTCP’s new goal
of providing “Universal Access to Quality TB Care.” Since the
intervention was designed as a pilot, it was modified slightly to
track multiple variables for each of these three sites. The PPIA
was the first model that aimed to tackle the heterogeneity of
the private sector. It aimed to increase notifications, shorten the
delay, and increase compliance by policing the private market
rather than by excluding it from offering treatment. The PPIA
differentiated the various services of the intervention, according
to the perceived quality of (and authority to provide) the care
offered by the different actors in the private sector. The private
sector for the purpose of this intervention was divided into
the following:
Central TB Division, Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare (2012), p. 58,59.
1 Primary medical service providers a. Stand-alone clinics of practitioners
of modern medicine
b. Stand-alone clinics of practitioners
of indigenous systems of medicine
and homeopathy, pharmacists and
less-than-fully qualified providers
(which some would call “quacks”)
2 Secondary medical service
providers
With specialty services, laboratories,
and pharmacies
3 Tertiary medical service providers With higher specialties and function;
some may be medical colleges
4 Implementing agencies May be NGO/INGO, CSO, CBO,
FBO, or other
5 Laboratories Large, networked (chain) or small
6 Pharmacies Large, networked (chain) or small
According to this division, the practitioners of modern
medicine, or those fully qualified—or for the purpose of this
paper, “formal providers”—were afforded the authority to give
vouchers for free diagnostic tests to people with suspected TB,
but they also could diagnose patients on the basis of the tests
or their clinical judgment. They were given the authority to
offer vouchers for treatment that would enable the patient to
obtain anti-TBmedications from any nearby affiliated or engaged
pharmacist or chemist, rather than go to the public sector for
treatment. Furthermore, the patient could visit the doctor every
15 or 30 days to get another voucher treatment for the next batch
of medicines. Every 3 months, the patient would be asked to take
a sputum test again to check their progress.
The registering of patients under the PPIA scheme would
automatically be registering the patient into the RNTCP by the
agency, which in Patna was World Health Partners. To give
the vouchers, the providers would have to register the patients
for either testing or treatment and the registration would allow
the patients’ treatment as well as the providers’ activity to be
tracked. Laboratories were engaged where the vouchers could be
redeemed and chemists were also engaged and reimbursed for
the anti-TB medications that were sold through vouchers. These
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chemists were directed to stock the anti-TB medicines that had
been approved by the government, which the providers were
trained to prescribe2. The radical break that the PPIA model
advocated was that the private providers would notify patients
into the RNTCP, but they did not need to refer them to the public
sector for treatment. Rather, they could prescribe treatment that
the PPIA agency would ensure followed the Standards for TB
Care in India (STCI). Wells et al. write, “Results-based financing
has been tried both by funding agencies and by governments
for disbursement of their own money, but governments can be
reluctant to directly fund private sector entities with domestic
resources. Thus, there has been limited work on creating efficient,
results-based pathways from governments to private providers”
(Wells et al., 2015, p. 6). In other words, governments have been
reluctant to reimburse private sector profits with public monies.
The Gates Foundation, as a technical advisor to the Government
of India in their formulation of the NSP to combat TB, agreed
to fund the private sector in their treatment of TB patients.
Therefore, the PPIA is singularly placed, at least in India, to
inform us about the pattern of private providers’ clinical protocol
in addressing TB. As the PPIA allowed providers to dispense
and oversee treatment that was free for the patients, the act
of notification became different from the act of diagnosis, and
neither could address the delay in diagnosis. In other words, a
provider could possibly not diagnose patients immediately, but
later in their subsequent visits, and they might diagnose, but still
not notify.
Furthermore, the PPIA had not barred or forbade the
doctors from using sputum AFB instead of GeneXpert; the
intervention had assumed that since GeneXpert was technically
much superior, the providers would obviously gravitate toward
its utilization. Since the use of sputum AFB was already very low,
the intervention had to encourage microbiological confirmation
for diagnosing among formal providers along with the use
of GeneXpert. These two objectives were not initially seen
as contradictory, since it was reasonably expected that the
incentivized behavior change once established—diagnosing on
the basis of microbiological confirmation—would migrate from
older technology to newer technology3. The clinical realities
that I describe below, however, transformed this simultaneous
encouragement of older technology into a competition with
newer technology. Another set of contradiction emerged because
the PPIA pilot made GeneXpert available only in the private
2The PPIA can be seen to modify previous models to engage the private sector
to the extent that the providers were given the authority to initiate and oversee
treatment, albeit under the supervision of the PPIA agency. The PPIA was tasked
with the responsibility of controlling the regimen that could be prescribed, thereby
making sure the patients that did get registered were being treated according to the
protocol set by WHO and publicized as the STCI.
3Initially, there were other concerns as well, which the intervention had to
continuously tinker with as more and more data were collected; for example, since
GeneXpert is relativelymore expensive than sputumAFB, the PPIA had no existing
data on how providers would convince patients to bear the costs initially. Given the
additional value that GeneXpert brought to the clinic, and that the test was made
affordable through various market logics, it was expected that the comparatively
more expensive GeneXpert would replace the cheaper and unreliable SputumAFB.
This was not the case and very quickly the intervention corrected itself to make
GeneXpert completely free just like the sputum AFB, but this was not what set up
a competition between the older and newer technology.
sector in Patna, even though its use was being scaled up
slowly across the country.While GeneXpert seemingly dovetailed
the ambitions of the state in bringing the private sector
under control, and global health, in providing quick affordable
diagnosis, it inevitably ended up competing with other tests
including those that check for drug susceptibility.
THE EXPERT IN THE MACHINE
CBNAAT (GeneXpert) was initially developed in 2002 by
Cepheid, an American diagnostics company, to rapidly detect
anthrax following the panic ensuing in 2001 when anthrax
spores were sent through the United States Postal Service. The
Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics (FIND), a Swiss
non-profit that funds product development, recognized the
potential of GeneXpert for TB control and approached Cepheid
in 2006 along with funding from the US National Institute of
Health and the Gates Foundation to adapt the technology for
TB. David Alland at the University of Medicine and Dentistry
of New Jersey, whose research centers on rapid diagnostics for
biodefense and antiobiotic resistance, provided technical input
to develop cartridges that could be used for TB and hence made
possible for GeneXpert to be transferred from the context of
bioterrorism to Global Health. The FIND was already a member
of the Stop TB Partnership and had a “working relationship”
with the World Health Organization (WHO) (n.d.). Alongside
this existing network of actors, the pathological mechanism that
contributed to the rapid endorsement and uptake of GeneXpert,
at least by policy makers and global health organizations, is that
instead of testing for antigens or antibodies, it detects genetic
material. GeneXpert also bypasses the need to conduct a culture
test that detects resistance or sensitivity: it can simultaneously
detect the bacterium as well as its sensitivity to rifampicin, the
compound in anti-TB medications. Existing tests like the Drug
Sensitivity/Susceptibility test (C-DST), which uses liquid culture,
remain the gold standard and take over 2 months to give results.
The Line Probe Assay is the other test that can check a sputum
sample for the presence of bacterium as well as resistance to drugs
by amplifying the DNA present by polymerase chain reaction
and can take 7–15 days to yield results. Yet, the “technologic
imperative” for rapidly testing samples for resistance cannot be
said to have been solely driven by drug-resistant TB (Fuchs,
1968); the disease remains notoriously strapped for funding
given the unequal distribution of its burden with the poorest
neighborhoods suffering the most (Pai, 2018). Nevertheless, after
it had been established that drug-resistant TB can be transmitted
and not just acquired through intermittent treatment in the early
1990’s, existing research and innovation was put to work to make
GeneXpert available to global health (Porter and Farmer, 2013).
The lack of quick reliable tests was also keenly felt in Patna.
The existing tests (C-DST and Line Probe Assay) were considered
very expensive and doctors prescribed them very rarely, claiming
that their patients could not afford them. A doctor told me that
in addition to the fact that the tests were available in only two
labs in the entire city, the samples were not actually tested in
Patna but were sent to New Delhi to another lab for testing;
thus, the test results would take even longer for patients in Patna.
Apart from the constraint of time, the issue of affordability, the
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market, and class played out in a very specific way. When I
enquired why these tests had not become popular in the private
sector in Patna, a doctor informed me that if a patient could
afford the tests, they would usually travel to another nearby city,
like Calcutta, Delhi, or Mumbai, for their treatment. Because of
time constraints, along with better facilities available in other
places, Patna then never faced pressures from the market to
supply these tests. By 2012, it was reported that the public sector
was woefully ill prepared to test samples for drug resistance.
The NSP stated, “As of December 2011, 35 C-DST labs were
accredited under RNTCP to provide services for the diagnosis
and follow-up of MDR TB patients [Multi-Drug-Resistant TB].
Eighteen of the 35 accredited C-DST labs are also accredited
under RNTCP to provide services for diagnosis ofMDR-TB using
a rapid molecular test—the Line Probe Assay (LPA) that has
a turnaround time of 48–72 h as compared to 3–4 months in
conventional testing” (Central TB Division, Directorate General
of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2012,
p. 68). These extenuating circumstances in TB control led to
accelerating the assessment of GeneXpert’s efficacy and accuracy
for diagnosing TB (Boehme et al., 2010; Small and Pai, 2010),
and in December of 2010, the WHO endorsed its use by calling
it “a major milestone for global TB diagnosis and care” [World
Health Organization (WHO), 2010]. Given the issue of missed
and late diagnoses because of lack of use of sputum microscopy,
use of ineffective tests as mentioned above, and the threat of
drug resistance, the importance and hope attached to GeneXpert
cannot be overstated. Satyanarayana et al. (2015) reported
“considerable heterogeneity in the proportion of providers who
were aware that patients with suspected pulmonary TB should
undergo sputum examination, ranging from as low as 17% to as
high as 94%. Five studies that provided information on practices
(mostly by interviewing patients regarding provider practices)
reported that, of persons with cough of 2–3 weeks’ duration, only
11–59% were advised to undergo sputum examination” (p. 755).
To address this lack of use of sputum to diagnose TB patients,
the NSP in India guided by the WHO also endorsed the test. The
responsibility of demonstrating its feasibility was put on the PPIA
pilot intervention.
In her analysis of new technology adoption, Koenig writes,
“once a new technology is developed, the forces favoring
its adoption and continued use as a standard therapy are
formidable” (Koenig, 1988, p. 467). I have attempted to describe
the formidable forces working at the level of the pathology of the
disease, public health research, and global health organizations
and I now turn to how GeneXpert was made available in India.
Given the exorbitant cost of the GeneXpert machines and hence
the cost of the test, the next immediate goal was to demonstrate
the feasibility of large-scale use of GeneXpert, which would
also then distribute the cost of such an expensive endeavor.
An initiative was launched in 2013 by a coalition of varied
stakeholders including 23 private diagnostic companies and the
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry,
with funding from the Clinton Health Access Initiative, to make
GeneXpert available and affordable in India (Kay, 2013). This
coalition was called the “Initiative for Promoting Affordable,
Quality TB tests” (IPAQT) and it negotiated between the private
labs and cepheid for procuring the tests at a cheaper price in
exchange for charging the patients less (Pai, 2013). By the time
the PPIA began offering its services in 2013, IPAQT had installed
machines widely only in some cities, including Mumbai, but
not in Patna where ethnographic research was conducted by
the author and the editor (Veena Das) as part of the impact
evaluation team. Only two labs in Patna had agreed to join
IPAQT to bring GeneXpert testing and one was removed from
the program in early 2015 for using expired cartridges; the
other decided to drop out at the same time because the volume
of patients was not high enough in Patna to counter a low
margin of profit. Since there was such low uptake of technology
among lab owners, the interface agency that was granted the
contract to be the PPIA had to innovate at several levels to
make GeneXpert available. The interface agency in Patna was
World Health Partners and they were given permission to run
their own lab, which would conduct the GeneXpert tests. This
was not ideal since the goal was to make GeneXpert sustainable
as a profit-making product in the market. It was hoped that
after a few years, GeneXpert would be popular enough that
the agency would no longer need to run its own lab. So, to
popularize GeneXpert, the agency, in partnership with Unihealth
Lab, installed machines from the beginning of the intervention.
Not only were providers given the relevant literature regarding
GeneXpert tests, training sessions were regularly held to explain
the emerging rifampicin resistance in patients. The infrastructure
was further developed to ensure the smooth and seamless use of
GeneXpert with technicians trained to run the tests, as well as
support made available in case the machines malfunctioned and
stopped working.
ART, EVIDENCE, AND EXPERTISE
During my 20 months of fieldwork in Patna, the capital city of
the eastern state of Bihar, I conducted research that included
interviewing and shadowing formal and informal providers. I
also interviewed compounders (doctors’ assistants in clinics),
lab owners and technicians, pharmacy shop owners and their
assistants, patients, as well as the large field staff that manned the
PPIA intervention on the ground. I recorded these conversations
in an attempt to understand how the PPIA intervention was
received and recognized by the various actors that comprised
the medical infrastructure and market of the city. The pattern
of uptake that emerged showed that rather than GeneXpert
simply replacing an older unreliable technology, adjustments
needed to be made continuously in how the new technology
was offered, addressing concerns that were not only particular
to the city but also particular to the practices of providers
and patients. In short, Patna was not a passive location where
GeneXpert was welcomed without suspicion. The vacuum that
the new technology was filling was a scientific construction—the
new technology did not represent an articulation of preexisting
anticipation or demand4. The rich body of work broadly called
the “sociology of expectations” has shown how new technology
4It must also be mentioned that this was specific to the landscape of Patna; other
cities where the multiple actors have a different relation to each other have resulted
in a different pattern on how GX is used. For example, see McDowell et al. (2018)
for how GX was utilized by informal providers in Mumbai.
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is discursively produced with hope, expectations, and optimism
attached to it (Brown and Michael, 2003). Yet, when we look at
a different set of experts who are positioned differently to the
technology, as in the case of formal providers in Patna, we see
suspicion, skepticism, and pessimism. The issue is not one of
mistranslation since both sets of experts, the ones who endorse
and encourage use of GeneXpert as well as the doctors, one of
the consumers of the technology, are trained in the language of
science and biomedicine.
To understand the resistance to GeneXpert, we must once
again go back to the issue of the low use of sputum AFB
to diagnose patients with TB. Since both sputum AFB and
GeneXpert located the evidence of TB in the sputum sample
of the patient, it was necessary to explore why the providers
were not confident of finding the truth of the illness in that
instance of pathological markers and technology. The reliability
of sputum AFB depends on various factors including the quality
of reagent used, the training and experience of lab technicians,
but also the sputum sample. The test is most effective if the
sputum that is being tested is one that has been expectorated
in the morning. These samples have the highest concentration
of the bacterium and that cuts the chances of a false negative.
Providers complained that since a large share of patients that
sought health care in Patna were traveling from the surrounding
villages and towns and were unable to return the next day with
the sputum sample, samples collected on the spot were often not
the best samples to be tested. The patients who lived nearby and
were able to return the next day to the doctor or the lab were
rarely following the instructions; they would offer excuses that
they expectorated their morning sample during brushing and the
second sample delivered was not the best for the most accurate
results. I must add though, throughout my study, that I never
once encountered a doctor explaining the proper way to collect
sputum to the patient; the task fell on the compounder who gave
vague instructions or the field officers who could only explain but
not ensure that the patient would follow through. This disinterest
in sputum tests reflected the long mistrust in the labs and the lack
of confidence in the ability of the actors to follow instructions
rather than a resistance to the established clinical protocol on part
of the doctors.
My interview with technicians showed a similar stance toward
the high possibilities of the test reflecting inaccurate results
but the technicians shifted the blame from patients to the
force of market competition. A lab owner said, “Nowadays, a
lab technician with even a few months of apprenticeship is
borrowing money and setting up shop, he pays the doctors
a cut of his earnings and gets patients. He does not have
any experience, it took me more than 20 years to become
an expert. Books cannot teach you how to recognize that the
stain you are seeing is because the reagent is old and has
crystallized not because there is a bacterium. You have to learn
through experience that if the sputum is too watery you have
to heat it so that the water evaporates, but you cannot heat
it so much that the sample is destroyed.”5 The lab owner was
5All participants were informed as to the purpose of the interview, which was
recorded with their consent. This consent included consent for publication of their
verbatim quotes.
not raising a moot point; the market was perceptibly flooded
with small pathology labs that were competing against each
other for a share of the patient population. The unregulated
diagnostics and pathology labs are constantly a source of
complaint since they make effective banning of outdated
tests difficult (Jarosławski and Pai, 2012). Furthermore, the
experiential and innovative knowledge that plays a role in
the quality of services offered were not or perhaps cannot be
integrated in the protocols of the intervention. The differential
control of these impersonal variables distributed among the
patient, provider, and the lab technician resulted in a practice
in which providers were reluctant to rely only on one test for
confirming a diagnosis or clinical suspicion, and even less on just
a sputum sample.
Providers in Patna very rarely diagnosed or tested patients
with TB in their first visit and instead ran a therapeutic trial of
broad-spectrum antibiotics and other non-specific therapies such
as steroids, anti-histaminics, and bronchodilators (McDowell and
Pai, 2016). When that failed to provide relief, they would send
the patients to be tested for TB. Even then, doctors did not rely
on a single test but used a variety of tests to confirm or disprove
their clinical judgment. Since the providers were aware of the
comorbidities, the history of bodies, and of the local biologies,
they relied on a battery of evidence ranging from auscultation
to the sound of crackling that lungs with infections produce, X-
rays, blood work (to show an infection), sputum microscopy, as
well as tests like Mantoux and even banned serological tests. A
provider told me that he used a variety of these tests because
“there is no one test that can be completely reliable, a patient’s
breathing might not reveal anything but the X-ray will, if that
does not reveal something sputum might, sometimes Mantoux
also reveals something.” Each of the top-notifying providers had
developed a clinical routine through which they would try and
confirm their diagnosis. A gynecologist affirmed her faith in
the Mantoux test by irritably saying, “I know it checks only
latent TB but sometimes when there is a high load then the
induration [pathological marker/bump] will be much larger. I
have seen indurations as large as 30mm.” Providers also said,
“Sometimes no test catches it, but I suspect it so I start the
treatment therapeutically.” There is good reason to develop a
personal clinical routine, not only because there are inevitably
variations in the biological and clinical symptoms of TB, but
also because the existing infrastructure cannot be entirely trusted
to provide reliable results (Achanta et al., 2013). During my
fieldwork, the city was also hit with minor medical scandals
that uncovered how rejected medical technologies from the First
World were being sold in ThirdWorld markets at cheaper prices.
The diagnostics market, along with the history of patients’ and
providers’ experiences, had implications for the promise that
GeneXpert was said to offer.
Through the course of the intervention, it became evident
that the private sector operated very differently from city to city,
responding to different anxieties and different challenges to their
authority. The intervention experimented with allowing informal
providers to prescribe GeneXpert on the basis of the expectation
that if the patients went to the formal provider with a test result,
they would be put on treatment faster—cutting the delay in
diagnosis. Formal providers in Patna bristled at this change and
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threatened to stop participating in the program altogether. Patna
was in no shortage of formal providers with affordable expertise
and thus there was a smaller number of informal providers filling
in the gap for care that is so prevalent in other cities and even
more acutely present in rural India. The informal providers were
a constant source of irritation and anger for formal providers
trained in biomedicine; the latter saw the former as illegally
extending their authority when they prescribed scheduled drugs
and ordered diagnostic tests, when only formal licensed providers
could offer patients such services. Thus, this experiment too
had to be halted with a provider complaining that, “if you are
giving the informal providers the power to do all this, then
what’s the need of formal providers?” Since there were not many
trained chest specialists in Patna, TB care was handled by general
physicians who had gained a reputation through their practice
as “TB doctors.” Bombay, unlike Patna, was populated by super-
specialized providers who did not have to fight for authority
against informal providers. Primary care was neither expected
nor given by formal providers in Bombay and, thus, domains of
authority and expertise remained more clearly marked. Patna’s
large population of general physicians had to continually fight
with the informal providers to serve as the primary provider for
families; they saw giving the informal providers the authority to
prescribe a test as empowering “quacks.”
Another effect of the unstable position of formal providers
was that providers were careful not to risk their practice being
accused as unethical and corrupt. The intervention initially
offered GeneXpert for free from May 2014 to March 2015 before
experimenting by offering it from April 2015 to May 2016 for
a subsidized cost of INR 300 (around 4 USD) for patients who
could afford it, while continuing to offer it at no charge for
patients below the poverty line. This subsidization proved to
be unpopular for several reasons. Since the advertisement at all
the networked and officially designated places announced boldly
that diagnostic tests were free, doctors reported that patients
became suspicious when they were asked to pay INR 300 and
accused them of corruption. Doctors further said that patients
remained suspicious, even when they were told that sputum
AFB was free but not GeneXpert and that their illness required
that they be checked for rifampicin resistance. Furthermore,
providers reported that patients became irritated when they were
told that they had to get their sputum tested again. Providers
said, “Patients get angry and ask, “Why are you getting another
sputum test done? You had just done it a few days ago?” They
think we are making money out of this so they don’t want to
get it done.” Not wanting to displease patients, the GeneXpert
was then not used to diagnose TB initially by doctors but only
to diagnose drug resistance cases when they saw and suspected
that treatments were failing. The subsidization failed to meet the
goal of cheaper and more accurate testing for earlier diagnosis
of TB. It could not have been predicted that patients would be
more aware than had been assumed regarding the information
they were gathering from the various advertisements and social
media messages targeted at them.
Joyce (2005), in her work on the use of magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), remarks that experts created and consumed
the MRI as being “interchangeable” with the person. MRI, for
Joyce’s physicians, enabled them to see a reality and truth that
patients could not provide; technology offered a transparent
knowledge that established a relationship between the physician
and the pathology, unhindered by the patient. Providers in
Patna did not view GeneXpert as holding any such promise and
viewed the intervention’s insistence on the use of GeneXpert
and the official protocol as threatening. Unlike MRI, GeneXpert
was not introduced as being interchangeable with the patient
but the strong encouragement of its use made it seem as if
it could be interchanged or replace the clinical expertise of
the provider in Patna. Several providers told me, “Look, X-
ray is not showing anything, sputum is not showing anything,
but GeneXpert showed it,” or “You say that GeneXpert is very
accurate, but it is not showing anything, but X-ray is clearly
showing abnormalities, sputum [microscopy] caught it.” Perhaps
the metaphor of catching comes closest to describing how
providers utilized diagnostic tests and signals to us providers’
perception of their skill, knowledge, and training as art rather
than following protocols. Providers in Patna waxed eloquently
about their expertise, which they had honed over decades of
experience6. They were quick to take offense at suggestions
that technology could reproduce the art of diagnosing, healing,
treating, curing, and caring that they hadmastered7. Though they
did not question the way in which evidence-based medicine was
being utilized, in so many words, they did have strong opinions
on how new medical devices were flooding the market and being
marketed by pharmaceutical representatives in their clinics on a
daily basis (Greenhalgh et al., 2014). A provider who had gained a
reputation as a TB specialist in Patna welcomed the opportunity
to discuss GeneXpert with me and said, “Look, I have read the
literature I was provided. The test is not 100 percent accurate.
They say so themselves—there is quite a large chance that the
results are false. It is like any other machine that these medical
representatives come to sell—every week there is a new asthma
machine, a new sugar machine, they come and they disappear.
How can one rely on them? At the end of the day I will have
to rely only on my knowledge when I see the patient.” Another
provider who found the insistence on sputum and any kind of
diagnostic tests very amusing said, “I have practiced for over 30
years and not in cities but in villages, there was no X-raymachine,
lab, and all this tam-jham (hassles), and I have diagnosed, treated,
and cured hundreds of patients just using my knowledge. I
do not need to rely on these tests at all.” Older technology
had always been secondary to the providers’ judgment and still
was in the national plan cited above. But in the intervention’s
design, incentives and targets for the various actors (including
6The narratives of professional accomplishment and skill that providers gave
me were tied to the moral and ethical self-fashioning that they claimed to have
achieved. Since a large number of these providers had worked in the public sector
in the past with far less resources, their work and accomplishments were seen in
service to the nation. Hence, I use the word “authority,” but perhaps “sovereignty”
is a better descriptor of their affect since their work, action, and authority was tied
to the sovereignty of the Indian nation state. I thank Stefan Ecks for this point who
has written on this issue (Ecks, 2004, 2013).
7For another example of how different cities with their own particular arrangement
of actors and network produce different reactions to GeneXpert, please see
McDowell et al. (2018).
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the overworked and underpaid field officers) were tied to not
just GeneXpert utilization but also positive diagnosis yielded by
that new piece of technology. The emphasis on GeneXpert in
the intervention design thereby set up a confrontation between
global health technology and providers and created a new
point of tension between expertise and technology. Providers
resented this call and eventually GeneXpert had to be utilized and
weighted differently given the less than enthusiastic reception
it received.
TRIED, TESTED, TRUSTED, AND FAILED:
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
GeneXpert is a nimble technology that can be adapted to different
diseases; different cartridges can be used to adapt the machine
to different diseases, such as hepatitis, HIV, chlamydia, and
gonorrhea. Cazabon et al. (2018) show that the machine is being
employed in different countries across the world for different
diseases and being underutilized for TB. These results reveal a
certain difference in how urgency and crisis are perceived across
various sites: global, national, city, and even neighborhood. This
is made clearer when we look at how GeneXpert failed to live
up to its promises for a different epidemic, namely, the Ebola
outbreak of 2014–2016. The context of nearly absent primary
health care diagnostic facilities in Sierra Leone resulted in a lack
of infrastructure that would have supported GeneXpert uptake,
hence ensuring the low utilization of GeneXpert (Vernooij,
2019). The experimentation with the introduction and use
of GeneXpert reveals the various competing ontologies of
disease. Hence, while technology both older and newer reveals
a relationship that is focused on the pathogen, clinical practice
reveals another that is fixed on the person. Relatedly, the different
ways in which the various actors define the urgency of the disease
further reveals that the temporality of the epidemic is not always
the temporality of the patient’s illness.
The concerns of global health with the urgencies and
transformation of the epidemic were not how the providers
were encountering their patients. The concerns of global health
with the urgency and transformation of the epidemic were not
reflected in how the providers were encountering and treating
their patients. The discourse around “the missing million”
and “disease eradication” never emerged in the interviews
with the practitioners in the private sector. The failure to
follow the protocol cannot be attributed to a lack of training,
motive, or profit, since all three were present and accounted
for with the formal providers. The unwillingness to relinquish
expertise to technology mirrors, in some ways, the earlier
unwillingness of providers to relinquish patients’ treatment
to the public sector. Providers in Patna in their complaints
about how the implementation of GeneXpert was threatening
their expertise were illustrating what Webster in this volume
has argued, that the “language of acceleration and faster
delivery” be interrupted by reaching an agreement on how
complexity be handled (Webster, 2019, p. 4). The complexity
that the providers in Patna were pointing toward was one
of unpredictable variation in how technology and biology
intersected. TB could only be recognized both, through and
despite diagnostic technologies. This instrumental relationship
with technology worked against GeneXpert’s reception as
a magic bullet; in short, providers were not so much as
against using technology but against it replacing expertise.
It was precisely because providers were well-aware of the
complexity of TB—in the unexpected ways it afflicts and
reveals itself in a patient—that they were unwilling to accelerate
use of GeneXpert at the cost of their own skill, expertise,
and experience.
Hence, to conclude, to some extent, the story of GeneXpert is
a familiar story, even within the narrow scope of TB diagnostics.
As Small and Pai remind us, the conventional nucleic acid
amplification tests “have been licensed for nearly 20 years and
yet have not had a substantial effect on tuberculosis control”
(Small and Pai, 2010, p. 1071). Studying experts in places that
are usually the sites of global health intervention reveal a limit
to the emphasis on hope and hype that is embedded in new
genetic technology (Rose and Novas, 2005). In contrast, the
affects tethered to GeneXpert were skepticism and doubts of
private providers. Hence, rather than technological innovation
moving in a unilinear direction (upstream or downstream), the
local professional and social context within which it is interpreted
and used in practice has vital implications for what the future of
global public health might hold, not only for TB but also for new
health technologies in general (Street, 2018). This paper has tried
to highlight how such shifts in India necessarily come up against
the knotty relation between the state, the market, and private
providers, as seen in Patna.
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